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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
 
Nature of the Case 
 
 After a jury trial, a jury found Dan Ray Nelson guilty of sexual battery of a minor 
child sixteen or seventeen years old.  Mr. Nelson appealed, asserting his right to a fair 
trial, guaranteed by the United States and Idaho Constitutions, had been violated 
because of the prosecutor’s misconduct.  Specifically, Mr. Nelson asserted the 
prosecutor struck multiple “foul blows” during closing argument by impermissibly 
vouching for the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing to the 
emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury, and this prosecutorial misconduct amounted to 
fundamental error. 
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State contended Mr. Nelson did not show 
fundamental error in the prosecutor’s closing argument, because the prosecutor did not 
commit impermissible vouching or appeal to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the 
jury.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.)  This Reply Brief is necessary to address the State’s 
arguments, which are unavailing. 
 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief.  They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Did the State violate Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by committing multiple 





The State Violated Mr. Nelson’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Committing 




Mr. Nelson asserts the State violated his right to a fair trial, guaranteed by the 
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, and Article I, § 13 
of the Idaho Constitution, by committing multiple acts of prosecutorial misconduct during 
closing argument.  Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct during 
closing argument by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the 
prosecutor and by appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.  These 
prosecutorial “foul blows” committed during closing arguments amounted to 
fundamental error and this Court should vacate Mr. Nelson’s conviction in light of 
the misconduct. 
 
B. Fundamental Error Occurred In This Case When The State Violated Mr. Nelson’s 
Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial By Committing Multiple Acts Of Prosecutorial 
Misconduct During Closing Argument 
 
 Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct, in violation of 
Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial, by vouching for the credibility of the 
investigating officer and the prosecutor and by appealing to the emotion, passion or 
prejudice of the jury.  The error plainly existed, and the misconduct prejudiced 
Mr. Nelson.  Thus, fundamental error occurred in this case.  See State v. Perry, 150 
Idaho 209, 227 (2010); State v. Gross, 146 Idaho 15, 22 (Ct. App. 2008). 
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 The State argues Mr. Nelson has not shown fundamental error in the 
prosecutor’s closing argument.  (See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.)  The State’s arguments 
are unavailing. 
 The first prong of fundamental error review here asks whether the prosecutor 
violated Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial by committing misconduct.  See 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226-27.  Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct 
by vouching for the credibility of the investigating officer and the prosecutor and by 
appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury. 
 
1. Vouching For The Credibility Of The Investigating Officer 
Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for the 
credibility of the investigating officer.  Specifically, the prosecutor vouched for the 
credibility of Detective John Marley by expressing a personal belief as to the credibility 
of Detective Marley that was not based on inferences from evidence presented at trial.  
The prosecutor urged the jury to believe Detective Marley not because of the evidence 
presented at trial, but “because the absurdity to suggest Detective Marley would lie 
about this makes my skin crawl.”  (See Tr., p.493, Ls.5-8.)  The prosecutor expressed 
his personal belief as to the credibility of Detective Marley, and that personal belief was 
based not on inferences from evidence presented on trial but on the prosecutor’s own 
visceral reaction.  See State v. Adamcik, 152 Idaho 445, 481-82 (2012).  
The State contends the prosecutor’s argument was proper, because there was 
nothing in the argument “suggesting it was based on anything other than the evidence.”  
(Resp. Br., p.7.)  However, the State ignores the distinction the prosecutor drew 
between his attempt to walk through the interview “very objectively,” i.e., based on the 
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evidence presented at trial, and the prosecutor’s own subjective response, namely that 
“the absurdity to suggest that Detective Marley would lie about this makes my skin 
crawl.”  (See Tr., p.493, Ls.1-8.)  Thus, the prosecutor expressed that his personal 
belief as to the credibility of Detective Marley was based not on inferences from 
evidence presented on trial but on the prosecutor’s own visceral reaction.  See 
Adamcik, 152 Idaho at 481-82.  Thus, the prosecutor committed misconduct.  See 
Gross, 146 Idaho at 19-20. 
 
2. Vouching For The Prosecutor And The Investigating Officer 
Mr. Nelson further asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by vouching for 
himself and the investigating officer.  Specifically, the prosecutor’s comments on how 
“we can do a better job” in coming up with a lie aligned Detective Marley with the 
prosecutor and emphasized the prosecutor and the witness were working together on 
the same team.  The prosecutor argued both he and the investigating officer were 
capable of telling “better” lies, and therefore the jury should believe the account of the 
prosecutor and Detective Marley.  (See Tr., p.494, L.13 – p.495, L.1.)  By aligning the 
witness with the prosecutor, the prosecutor’s comments on being capable of telling a 
better lie argued that the jury should believe the prosecutor and Detective Marley 
because they were representatives of the State, inducing the jury “to trust the 
Government’s judgment rather than its own view of the evidence.”  See United States v. 
Young, 470 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1985).  Further, by declaring that he and the investigating 
officer could do a better job in lying, the prosecutor expressly referred to facts not in 
evidence.  See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20. 
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The State argues that the prosecutor’s argument “was a proper argument for the 
jury to apply its common sense and experience in evaluating whether Detective 
Marley’s testimony regarding [Mr.] Nelson’s confession was a lie or the truth,” and that 
“in context the ‘we’ used by the prosecutor is apparently a reference to the prosecutor 
and the jurors being able to come up with a better lie than the detective allegedly did.”  
(Resp. Br., pp.8-9.)  The State’s argument appears to be based on a misapprehension 
of what the prosecutor actually said.  The prosecutor’s comments did not happen in the 
context of any reference to the jurors being able to come up with a better lie.  Rather, 
the prosecutor’s made the comments to the jury in the context of whether “[Detective] 
Marley’s lying to you.”  (See Tr., p.494, Ls.13-18.)  The prosecutor argued:  “Well, if he’s 
lying to you—I don’t mean to sound terrible, but I can do a better job.  I mean, if you 
want me to lie to you, we can do a better job.  Okay?”  (Tr., p.494, Ls.18-21.)   
Regarding Detective Marley, the prosecutor later argued, “[a]nd to suggest he’s lying 
about something, when the lie could easily have been much better . . . .”  (Tr., p.494, 
L.25 – p.495, L.1.) 
Thus, nothing in the context of the prosecutor’s comments suggests the 
prosecutor was referring to the jurors being able to come up with a better lie.  The 
prosecutor’s comments that Detective Marley could do a better job lying and that the 
prosecutor himself could do a better job lying (see Tr., p.494, L.13 – p.495, L.1), instead 
indicate the prosecutor’s use of “we” was to align Detective Marley with the prosecutor 
and emphasize the prosecutor and the witness were working together on the same 
team.  Thus, the prosecutor’s comments were misconduct.  See Young, 470 U.S. at 18-
19; Gross, 146 Idaho at 20. 
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3. Appealing To The Emotion, Passion Or Prejudice Of The Jury 
Additionally, Mr. Nelson asserts the prosecutor committed misconduct by 
appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury.  Specifically, the prosecutor 
invited the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim.  By inviting the jury to step 
into the shoes of the alleged victim, C.F., at the time he reported the alleged offenses to 
the forensic interviewer, the prosecutor urged the jury to find Mr. Nelson guilty based on 
imagining themselves being placed in C.F.’s position and their resulting sympathy for 
him.  See Commonwealth v. Cherry, 378 A.2d 800, 804-05 (Pa. 1977); 
Commonwealth v. Olmande, 995 N.E.2d 797, 801 (Mass. App. 2013); State v. 
McDaniel, 462 S.E.2d 882, 883-84 (S.C. Ct. App. 1995).  Those comments improperly 
appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury through the use of 
inflammatory tactics.  See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21. 
 Relying on Lopez v. Langer, 114 Idaho 873 (1988), the State contends the 
prosecutor’s argument, “made in relation to the victim’s credibility, was a proper 
argument based on the jury’s common sense and life experiences, and not a call to 
sympathize with the victim.”  (Resp. Br., pp.9-10.)  However, Lopez does not justify the 
prosecutor’s improper comments in this case. 
Lopez was a civil case centering on whether the defendant was the owner of a 
car for purposes of extending tort liability for a fatal accident under the theory of 
negligent entrustment.  Lopez, 114 Idaho at 874.  The defendant, on the advice of his 
attorney, had endorsed and delivered the title of the car to another party, but the other 
party did not register the vehicle in her name after receiving the title.  Id. at 874-75.  In 
closing argument, regarding the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions, defense 
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counsel asked the jury to place themselves in the same position as the defendant with 
respect to the alleged transfer of title.  See id. at 878.  The Idaho Supreme Court held 
that such “golden rule” arguments are “only appropriate when used to ask the jury to 
assess the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying upon their own common 
sense and life experiences.”  Id. (emphasis added). 
Here, the State confuses asking a jury, in a civil case, to assess the 
reasonableness of a party’s actions, with inviting a jury, in a criminal case, to find a 
witness credible and thus find the defendant guilty.  Unlike the closing argument in 
Lopez, the prosecutor’s comments in the instant case were directed not at the 
reasonableness of C.F.’s actions, but at C.F.’s credibility.  (See Tr., p.489, L.12 – p.490, 
L.2.)  Thus, Lopez, where the Court held “golden rule” arguments are “only appropriate 
when used to ask the jury to assess the reasonableness of a party’s actions by relying 
upon their own common sense and life experiences,” 114 Idaho at 878, does not justify 
the prosecutor’s improper comments.  The prosecutor’s comments were misconduct 
because they improperly appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury 
through the use of inflammatory tactics.  See Gross, 146 Idaho at 20-21. 
Because the prosecutor’s comments vouched for the credibility of the prosecutor 
and investigating officer and appealed to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the jury by 
asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim, the prosecutor 
committed misconduct that violated Mr. Nelson’s constitutional right to a fair trial.  As 
demonstrated above, the State’s arguments to the contrary are unavailing.1 
                                            
1 The second prong of fundamental error review for prosecutorial misconduct asks 
whether the error plainly exists, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure to 
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CONCLUSION 
 For the above reasons, as well as the reasons contained in the Appellant’s Brief, 
Mr. Nelson respectfully requests that this Court vacate his conviction for sexual battery 
of a minor child sixteen or seventeen years old and remand the case for a new trial. 
 DATED this 1st day of March, 2016. 
 
      ___________/s/______________ 
      BEN P. MCGREEVY 
      Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
                                                                                                                                            
object was a tactical decision.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226.  The State has not 
specifically addressed whether the misconduct asserted by Mr. Nelson plainly existed. 
(See Resp. Br., pp.4-11.)  Thus, no further response on this point is necessary, and 
Mr. Nelson would direct the Court’s attention to pages 18-19 of the Appellant’s Brief. 
The third prong of fundamental error review asks whether the misconduct 
prejudiced the defendant.  See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 228.  The State has only 
specifically addressed prejudice with respect to Mr. Nelson’s assertion the prosecutor 
committed misconduct through appealing to the emotion, passion or prejudice of the 
jury by asking the jury to imagine themselves as the alleged victim.  (See Resp. 
Br., p.11 n.1.)  The State’s argument on this point is largely unremarkable and generally 
addressed in Mr. Nelson’s Appellant’s Brief.  Thus, no further response is necessary, 
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